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SLAVERY AND THE MARSHALL COURT: PREVENTING
“OPPRESSIONS OF THE MINOR PARTY”?
LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN*
When Alexander Hamilton was defending the life tenure of the
federal judiciary on the grounds that it would secure judicial indepen-
dence under the new Constitution, he argued that such indepen-
dence from electoral pressures was needed for the judges to fulfill
successfully their appointed task of guarding against legislative attacks
on the constitutional “rights of individuals” and against “serious op-
pressions of the minor party in the community.”1  As a member of the
New York Manumission Society, Hamilton could not have been una-
ware of the implications of his argument for black Americans.2  If any
branch of government were going to protect the rights of blacks,
Hamilton seemed to suggest, it would be the judges, whose lifetime
tenure would protect them against those “ill humors” that might
sometimes take hold of popular majorities.3  Hamilton knew that not
every oppressive piece of legislation would be so blatant that it would
violate the Constitution, but he hoped and predicted that judicial in-
dependence would move the judges to “mitigat[e] the severity and
confin[e] the operation of” such “unjust and partial laws” that might
“injur[e] . . . the private rights of particular classes of citizens.”4
This Essay takes a close look at his prediction with respect to the
fate of black Americans during the tenure of the Marshall Court, the
first Supreme Court to deal extensively with slavery cases.5  It first lo-
cates the Court within the context of what the political branches were
doing on matters of race and slavery in order to assess how the judicial
branch measured up in light of Hamilton’s prediction.6  In the pro-
Copyright  2007 by Leslie Friedman Goldstein.
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1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
2. See EDGAR J. MCMANUS, A HISTORY OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN NEW YORK 168 (1966)
(discussing Hamilton’s involvement with the New York Manumission Society).
3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 437.
4. Id. at 438.
5. See generally Donald M. Roper, In Quest of Judicial Objectivity: The Marshall Court and
the Legitimation of Slavery, 21 STAN. L. REV. 532 (1969) (discussing various contexts in which
the Marshall Court addressed the issue of slavery).
6. See infra Part I.
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cess, it uncovers and explores the fact that the Marshall Court appears
to have shifted in its treatment of slaves about midway through Mar-
shall’s term, around the year 1817.7  Until 1817 the Court appears to
have given priority to firming up the property rights of slave holders
where laws applied in arguably ambiguous or debatable ways.  From
1817 onward, the Marshall Court often gave priority to liberty, inter-
preting the laws in pro-liberty directions when the laws spoke ambigu-
ously enough to make this feasible.8  The Essay then considers
possible explanations for why the Marshall Court shifts, and identifies
as the most promising explanation the formation of the American
Colonization Society in December 1816, of which Justice Bushrod
Washington and Chief Justice John Marshall were nationally promi-
nent leaders.9  Then the Essay returns to the question of assessing
Hamilton’s prediction.
I. THE EARLIEST AMERICAN LEGISLATION ON RACE AND SLAVERY
White British settlers established the first successful British colony
in North America at Jamestown, Virginia in 1607.10  In 1619, the first
Africans known to have arrived in an American colony were (forcibly)
brought to Jamestown, and evidence suggests that initially they were
treated as indentured servants, who were freed after their period of
servitude.11  Only in the second half of the seventeenth century did
laws begin to make sharper distinctions between indentured persons
and slaves, and to link slavery specifically to persons of African
descent.12
By the time of the United States Constitution, although several
states in the northern U.S. had freed their slaves by legislation, and
Massachusetts had done so by judicial interpretation of its state Con-
stitution, slavery was firmly entrenched by law in the majority of
states.13  At some point or other, prior to the Civil War, every single
7. See infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. R
8. See infra Table (compiling the slavery cases decided by the Marshall Court).
9. See infra notes 104–108 and accompanying text. R
10. PAUL FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE 1 (1986).
11. Id.; A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS 20–22 (1978).
12. See Higginbotham, supra note 11, at 32–40 (discussing the series of legislative acts R
in the second half of the seventeenth century that reduced most Africans in Virginia to
permanent servitude); see also Finkelman, supra note 10, at 1 (same). R
13. FINKELMAN, supra note 10, at 27; LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO R
IN THE FREE STATES, 1790–1860, at 3 & n.1 (1961); see also Douglas Harper, Slavery in the
North (2003), http://www.slavenorth.com (discussing the history of slavery in the Northern
states).  Completing the post-Revolutionary-War trend of abolition in the states north of
Delaware, New York in 1799 and New Jersey in 1804 adopted legislation that freed the
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state, along with the federal government, discriminated against blacks
in some way.14
One year after the Bill of Rights was ratified, the Congress of the
United States adopted the Uniform Militia Act, requiring that every
free, able-bodied white male citizen between the ages of eighteen and
forty-five enroll in the national militia and supply himself with a
proper weapon and ammunition.15  Prior to this law a number of
states had allowed blacks into their state militias, and the meritorious
service of black soldiers during the Revolutionary War was still a rela-
tively fresh memory.16  Even with the federal law in place, many states,
North and South, ignored the racial restriction (if it was meant as a
restriction, rather than simply as a minimum membership) and en-
rolled free blacks in their militias, especially during times of
invasion.17
But militia discrimination was not the whole story.  In 1790 Con-
gress limited access to naturalization for U.S. citizenship to whites, a
limit that it re-enacted in 1802 with the phrase “[f]ree white
persons.”18
In 1810 Congress forbade blacks to be postal carriers, and in 1820
authorized the white male citizens of the District of Columbia to create
a municipal government and to adopt legal codes governing blacks
and slaves.19  Congress specifically authorized the District government
slaves but did so quite gradually. FINKELMAN, supra note 10, at 27; LITWACK, supra.  Penn- R
sylvania’s Abolition Act of 1780 also had been quite gradual; it liberated only persons born
after the Act and established indentured servitude until the age of 28 for all offspring of
present slaves. FINKELMAN, supra note 10, at 41; LITWACK, supra.  By 1830, more than 3,500 R
blacks remained in slavery in the North and more than two thirds of them resided in New
Jersey. LITWACK, supra at 14.
14. See LITWACK, supra note 13, at 30 (noting that both the states and the federal gov- R
ernment “generally agreed . . . that the Negro constituted an inferior race and that he
should occupy a legal position commensurate with his degraded social and economic con-
dition”).  Some examples were white preferences for the militia, segregated schools, laws
against miscegenation, laws imposing on blacks stiffer property qualifications for voting,
and laws requiring of blacks proof of freedom and a posted bond in order to enter the
state (the latter went unenforced).
15. Uniform Militia Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (1792) (repealed 1903) (emphasis added).
16. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 331–33 (1991).
17. Id. at 331–32.
18. Sanford M. Lyman, The Race Question and Liberalism: Casuistries in American Constitu-
tional Law, 5 INT’L J. POL., CULTURE & SOC’Y 183, 204 (1991); DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES
TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 20
(1991).
19. ROGER M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
175 (1997); NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 20. R
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to ban meetings of free blacks at night and to use whippings in the
punishment of slaves.20
In most states (including in the South) free blacks had been al-
lowed to vote in the late-eighteenth century.21  In the 1830s, as pro-
slavery sentiment heated up (see below), a number of these states cut
back on black suffrage rights, and the newly admitted states did not
extend the vote to blacks (with Oregon adding Chinese to the disen-
franchised category).22  By the time of the Civil War, the number of
states allowing blacks the equal right to vote had fallen to five.23
Some states even barred or restricted entry by free blacks, al-
though these laws were only sporadically enforced.24  On some occa-
sions, the Attorney General of the U.S. refused to U.S.-born, free
blacks the right to apply for publicly available land, and Secretaries of
State were sometimes unwilling to give free blacks passports, on the
grounds that they were not U.S. “citizens” in the full legal sense.25
The judicial system in the country, too, was infected with racial
subordination.26  Several Northern states refused to allow blacks to
testify against a white person, and only Massachusetts allowed blacks
to serve on juries.27
As to unfree blacks, since the country was a mix of slave states and
free states, the Constitution and pre-Civil War legislation show a
mixed record.  The Constitution omitted any explicit mention of
slaves or slavery, a stylistic choice that James Madison’s notes suggest
reflected a deliberate effort to avoid entrenching the institution of
slavery in the constitutive document of a free republic.28  On the
20. Act of May 4, 1812, ch. 75, 2 Stat. 721, 725 (amending the charter of the city of
Washington, D.C.).
21. SMITH, supra note 19, at 105–06; see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) R
393, 572–74 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting) (discussing the voting rights of blacks in various
states under the Articles of Confederation).  Blacks were clearly prohibited from voting, as
of 1790, in only three states: Virginia, Georgia, and South Carolina. EMIL OLBRICH, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SENTIMENT ON NEGRO SUFFRAGE TO 1860, at 7–9 (1969).
22. NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 28; SMITH, supra note 19, at 215.  New Jersey took the vote R
from blacks in 1807, Connecticut did so in 1818, and Pennsylvania in 1838. NIEMAN, supra
note 18, at 28. R
23. LITWACK, supra note 13, at 91.  These were Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maine, R
New Hampshire, and Vermont. Id.
24. Id. at 67–74.
25. SMITH, supra note 19, at 258; MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF R
CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 29 n.84 (2006).
26. See LITWACK, supra note 13, at 93–97 (discussing racial discrimination in the court- R
room and the “significant qualifications” added by various states to a black person’s right
to legal protection and a redress of injuries).
27. Id. at 93, 94.
28. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 417 (Max Ferrand ed.,
1911) (“Mr. Madison thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there
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other hand, the Constitution notoriously contains serious com-
promises with the institution:29
(1) The slave states were given a representation bonus by count-
ing each slave as an extra three-fifths of a person, instead of as zero30
(as might have been appropriate, since they had zero say in who gov-
erned them).  This fact meant that the voters in the Southern slave-
holding states were given a boost both in clout in the House of
Representatives (moving their numbers to more than forty-six percent
of the total rather than the forty-one percent it would have been) and
in the Electoral College, whose numbers were pegged to congres-
sional membership.31  (2) Congress was forbidden to ban the interna-
tional importation of slaves prior to 1808.32 However, in that year,
Congress did enact the ban.33  (3) The Fugitive Slave Clause says:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in Consequence of
any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Ser-
vice or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.34
(Incidentally, each of these clauses refers to slaves as “persons,” never
as “property,” so if the Constitution were read literally, the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause should arguably have freed all slaves
in federal jurisdictions.).35
Congress did immediately re-enact the prohibition on slavery in
the Northwest Territory (which had been in place under the Articles
of Confederation), and in 1794 it banned the export or international
transport of slaves and the use of U.S. vessels for the same.36  In nego-
could be property in men.”); see also NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 13 (noting that many of the R
Framers agreed with Madison and therefore “refused to give explicit recognition to the
institution” of slavery in the Constitution).
29. See NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 10 (discussing the concessions made by the North to R
the Southern states on the issue of slavery for the sake of constitutional reform and contin-
ued union).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
31. NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 11; see also Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the R
Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2002) (discussing the connection between
slavery and the decision to create the Electoral College).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
33. Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426.
34. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
35. See id. amend. V (stating that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”).
36. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50–53, 51 (adapting the provisions of the
Northwest Ordinance, in place under the Articles of Confederation, to the United States
Constitution); Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 347–49 (prohibiting the export of slaves
from the United States to any foreign country); SMITH, supra note 19, at 142. R
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tiating the Jay Treaty, the executive branch did abandon the demand,
desired by many slaveowners, that Britain pay reparations for slaves
she had freed during the Revolutionary War.37
On the other hand, Congress permitted slavery in the District of
Columbia and in the federal territory that later became Kentucky,
Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama, and in 1793 enacted a Fugitive
Slave Law.38  The Fugitive Slave Law arranged for the recapture of
slaves, even though the Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV of the
United States Constitution said nothing of federal enforcement
power, but simply prohibited state laws from releasing slaves and or-
dered nameless parties to “deliver[ ] up” such runaways “on Claim” of
a party to whom service was owed.39  This Fugitive Slave Clause ap-
pears in the article on interstate relations, not in any list of federal
powers, and it mentions only state actions, not federal enforcement.40
This is probably because the Clause was adapted from a clause in the
1787 Northwest Ordinance,41 itself adopted under the Articles of Con-
federation which contained no federal enforcement institutions.  The
model for the Clause was state extradition, not federal rendition, just
as with criminals.42  The 1793 law, by contrast, was a federal mandate.
It ordered federal district judges and local justices of the peace (who
were far more numerous) to issue a warrant allowing a purported
slave-owner (or his agent) who had captured a particular person to
remove that person from the state (to take back to slavery) whenever
that purported owner could present certification that he had sworn
before his home justice of the peace that he owned a particular run-
37. SMITH, supra note 19, at 142. R
38. NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 16–17; SMITH, supra note 19, at 143; Fugitive Slave Act of R
1793, ch. 7, §3, 1 Stat. 302, 302–05.
39. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; see Robert J. Kaczorowski, Fidelity Through History and
to It: An Impossible Dream?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1663, 1673 (1997) (noting that the Fugitive
Slave Clause in Article IV, section 2 delegates no enforcement power to Congress).
40. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 13; Kaczorowski, supra note R
39. R
41. RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN, ARE WE TO BE A NATION?: THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 177 (1987); see Northwest Ordinance of 1787, sec. 14, art. VI (providing that “any
person escaping into the [Northwest Territories], from whom labour or service is lawfully
claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and
conveyed to the person claiming his or her labour or service as aforesaid”).
42. The immediately preceding constitutional clause mandates state extradition of
criminals “fleeing from justice.” Paul Finkelman agrees with this reading. See Paul
Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 613–21 (1993) (discuss-
ing the origins of the Fugitive Slave Clause in Article IV and its relation to the provision
concerning the extradition of criminals).  The Fugitives from Justice Clause in Article IV
declares that fugitive criminals must be delivered up “on [d]emand of the executive
[a]uthority of the State from which he fled.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
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away.43  Under this federal law the black person accused as a slave had
no right to testify or to be defended by an attorney against the claim
of ownership.44
What had been basically a mixed picture evolved after 1830 to
one in which the pro-slavery forces increased their influence in all
three branches of government.  Southerners (probably due to the in-
creased importance of cotton in the regional economy) became more
intransigently pro-slavery, while abolitionist and anti-slavery sentiment
grew more widespread and more intense in the North.45  Southerners
claimed that abolitionist essays might stimulate slave revolts46 (even
though teaching a slave to read was a crime in many of the slave
states),47 leading to President Andrew Jackson’s decision in the 1830s
to have the national postmaster authorize local postmasters (federal
employees) to destroy anti-slavery tracts rather than allow them
through the mails, in flagrant contravention of existing federal law
and the First Amendment’s Freedom of Press Clause.48  The House of
Representatives from 1836 through 1844 observed a “gag rule” to for-
bid the reading aloud of, or discussing, petitions against slavery, de-
spite the right “to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances” enshrined in the First Amendment.49  The House in the
early 1840s, in the context of a controversy over the Southern impris-
onment of free black sailors while they were stationed in the South,
voted to reject a committee’s resolution, which would have declared,
in effect, that free (native-born) blacks had rights as citizens of the
United States.50
Presidents, with Senate confirmation, appointed Supreme Courts
that from the beginning contained a dominant presence of justices
43. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, §3, 1 Stat. 302, 302–05; see also NIEMAN, supra note
18, at 16–17 (noting that the second part of the 1793 Act, which dealt with runaway slaves R
as opposed to criminal fugitives, contained federal enforcement provisions); SMITH, supra
note 19, at 143 (noting that Congress actively perpetuated slavery through the enforce- R
ment provisions of the 1793 Act, even though there was no clear mandate in the Constitu-
tion for congressional enforcement of Article IV’s fugitive slave provision).
44. NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 17. R
45. See LITWACK, supra note 13, at 19–20 (noting that by 1830, while abolitionism estab- R
lished itself by reputation and numbers in the North, it had virtually disappeared in the
South); NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 16 (discussing the hundreds of pamphlets and thousands R
of petitions to Congress criticizing slavery by radical abolitionists from the North during
the 1830s).
46. NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 16. R
47. WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE 319–25 (New Am. Library 1969)
(1853); SMITH, supra note 19, at 219. R
48. NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 16. R
49. Id.
50. Id. at 22–24.
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from the South.  Of the justices who served up to the end of John
Marshall’s term in 1835, fourteen out of twenty-four came from slave
states.51  The section below details the Court decisions produced dur-
ing Marshall’s chief justiceship (1801–1835),52 a period that covered a
sizable portion of this period of geographic bias.
II. SUPREME COURT CASES 1801–1835: THE MARSHALL COURT AND
SLAVERY
It is within this context of widespread anti-black sentiments for-
malized into law throughout the U.S. and the post-1830 intensified
polarization of opinion on slavery that the Supreme Court decisions
are best assessed.  The racial discrimination (against free blacks) prev-
alent in state and federal law did not in the antebellum years produce
any Supreme Court cases, although they did produce a couple of im-
portant circuit court decisions from Marshall Court Justices.53  The
most prominent of the antebellum slavery cases concerned fugitive
slaves, but these did not reach the Supreme Court until the chief jus-
ticeship of Roger Taney (1836–1864).54  By the 1820s, the absence of
procedural protections for the accused in the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act
(and continuing later with respect to the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act) an-
gered many Northerners; several Northern states began to intervene,
both by legislating procedural protections for the accused runaways,
and ordering their own judges and sheriffs not to cooperate with the
slave-chasing enterprise.55  These clashes between federal and state
authority would eventually produce two well-known Supreme Court
decisions in the two decades preceding the Civil War: Prigg v. Penn-
sylvania56 and Ableman v. Booth,57 but no such fugitive case reached the
Marshall Court.
51. Id. This follows the standard practice of counting that includes the four-month
chief justiceship of John Rutledge who failed to get confirmed by the Senate.
52. Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1421, 1421 (2006).
53. See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366) (Justice John-
son declaring unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds a South Carolina law that
imprisoned free persons of color who worked on ships that landed in South Carolina for
the duration of the ship’s stay, and according to which, if the ship abandoned them there,
they would be sold as slaves); The Wilson v. United States, 30 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1820)
(No. 17846) (Justice Marshall declaring on rather tortured reasoning that the Virginia law,
meant to keep free Negro seamen imprisoned while docked, did not apply to the seamen
“of color” in question).
54. The first of these was Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
55. NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 17–18; L.F. Goldstein, State Resistance to Authority in Federal R
Unions: The Early USA (1790–1860) and the European Community, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 149,
164 (1997).
56. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
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Although slaves were mentioned in the Court’s first important de-
cision, Chisholm v. Georgia,58 in the context of being the only persons
in the U.S. who did not share in equal rights of citizenship,59 the Su-
preme Court took no slavery cases as such until after (the same year
that John Marshall became Chief Justice).  This was the year that Con-
gress adopted the extant slave law of Virginia and Maryland for the
parts of their territory that became the District of Columbia.60  In
many of its earliest slave cases, the Supreme Court’s role was that of
highest appellate court applying the law of this territory.61  Prior to
1801, other than in Chisholm, the only mention of slaves in Supreme
Court decisions occurred in lists of types of property.62  In these list-
ings, slavery was not singled out as warranting special treatment (apart
from the mandate regarding taxes in the Three-Fifths Clause)63 nor
was it presented as involving special moral issues.64
57. 62 U.S. 506 (1859).
58. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
59. Id. at 471–72.  The statement is:
[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly
the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects (unless the
African slaves among us may be so called) and have none to govern but themselves;
the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens . . . .
The Court’s implication here that free blacks were equally free citizens contrasts with Con-
gress’s untroubled assertion in 1820 that whites in the District of Columbia were author-
ized to impose special restrictions on free blacks, see supra note 19 and accompanying text, R
and with the Court’s notorious 1856 remark in Dred Scott v. Sanford, to the effect that free
blacks in the U.S. had no rights.  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
60. NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 16; see supra note 38 and accompanying text. R
61. See, e.g.,  Fenwick v. Chapman, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 461 (1835); Lee v. Lee, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 44 (1834); Mason v. Matilda, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 590 (1827); Davis v. Wood, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 6 (1816); Henry v. Ball, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1816); Mima Queen v. Hepburn,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813); Wood v. Davis, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 271 (1812); Scott v. Ben,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 3 (1810); Scott v. London, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 324 (1806); see also Table
infra.
62. See, e.g., Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 321 (1796) (listing slaves, alongside
goods, chattel and land, in the description of property comprising an estate); Ware v. Hyl-
ton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 201 (1796) (describing a 1779 Virginia statute stating that all the
property of British subjects left within Virginia at the time would pass by escheat and forfei-
ture to the Commonwealth, including “the lands, slaves, and other real estate”).  This con-
clusion is derived from a LexisNexis search for “slave” and “negro.”
63. See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 177 (1796) (discussing how the
Framers of the Constitution contemplated the large number of slaves and extensive tracks
of thinly settled land owned by Southerners as compared with Northerners in limiting
Congress’s power to tax).
64. The decision by Marshall in 1803, Hamilton v. Russell, similarly simply lists the slave
as chattel along with “other personal property” that was in dispute.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 309,
314–15 (1803).  Marshall continued this practice of dealing with slaves as the Court dealt
with other property in various property disputes that came before him. See, e.g., Ramsay v.
Lee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 401 (1807); Spiers v. Willison, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 398 (1807).
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During the Marshall Court years, issues concerning slavery arose
in the following contexts: (1) property disputes between white people
over particular slaves, which the Court handled according to rules that
would have applied to other chattel property;65 (2) lawsuits by slaves
claiming their freedom on one or another ground;66 and (3) ques-
tions of criminal law once federal law banned the export and import
of slaves.67  If one puts aside those cases where the Court was simply
settling property disputes over who owned which chattel, and focuses
on the cases involving slavery as such (i.e., in the latter two catego-
ries), what comes into view is a picture of a Court considerably less
opposed to slavery, especially for the first sixteen years, than one
might expect based on the public pronouncements of Justice Story,68
or the privately expressed detestation of slavery by Chief Justice Mar-
shall.69  It is even more puzzling if one accepts the assessment of histo-
rian Donald Roper that in terms of private sentiments, a majority of
the Marshall Court opposed slavery: two strongly (Story and McLean);
65. See supra note 64. R
66. See, e.g., Lee, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 44 (slaves brought petition for freedom under a
1796 Maryland statute making it illegal to import slaves for sale or to reside in Maryland);
Menard v. Aspasia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 505 (1831) (Missouri slave, born in Illinois, brought
suit claiming freedom under the Northwest Ordinance).
67. See, e.g., Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805) (dealing with the applica-
tion of the federal statute of limitations on criminal penalties to someone accused of en-
gaging in the forbidden export of slaves).  Congress banned slave importation in 1807 with
a law that went into effect after midnight December 31.  1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 202 (William M. Lacy ed., Blackstone Publ’g Co. 1889) (1826).
68. Outside of his judicial role, Justice Story consistently expressed the view that slavery
was an unjust and immoral institution, and within his judicial role he did the same for
trade in slaves.  For instance, at a public meeting in Salem, Massachusetts in 1819, Justice
Story insisted that the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the spirit of the
Constitution demand that Congress ban slavery in the territories. ROBERT M. COVER, JUS-
TICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 238–43 (1975); Roper, supra note 5, R
at 532.  As to the slave trade, on circuit in United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, Story went on for
page after page to condemn it as “breach[ing] . . . all the maxims of justice, mercy and
humanity,” as involving “corruption, and plunder, and kidnapping” and seizing of “the
young, the feeble, the defenceless, and the innocent,” as “desolat[ing] whole villages and
provinces,” as resulting in massive numbers of deaths in transit due to the “cold blood[ed]”
and “inhuman” treatment of the captives, and as “incurably unjust and inhuman.”  26 F.
Cas. 832, 845–48 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15551).
69. See Frances Howell Rudko, Pause at the Rubicon, John Marshall and Emancipation: Rep-
arations in the Early National Period?, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75, 79–80 (2001) (citing an
1826 letter to Timothy Pickering in which Marshall stated that “nothing portends more
calamity & mischief to the southern states than their slave population; Yet they seem to
cherish the evil . . .”).  Marshall himself owned a small number of slaves throughout his life,
and also bought them, and gave and received them as gifts. Id. at 77.  At the end of his life,
he freed one in his will and bequeathed the others. Id. He also supported a program of
voluntary emancipation to be funded by the federal government which would then “colo-
nize” (which he understood as repatriate) the freed slaves in Africa. Id. at 84–88.
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and two (Marshall and Washington) at least “tepid[ly],” in the sense
of “wish[ing] that slavery would somehow go away.”70
Whereas some biographers tend to single out various dicta or rul-
ings where John Marshall’s opinions helped slaves toward freedom;71
in fact, as the Table below reveals, he or his Court rather often sealed
the enslavement in question, even in cases that were reasonably con-
testable to the degree of (1) producing a non-unanimous vote on his
own Court (e.g., Lee v. Lee (1834)), (2) provoking a written dissent in
the Supreme Court (e.g., Mima Queen v. Hepburn (1813)), (3) over-
turning a circuit court reading to the contrary (in favor of freedom)
(e.g., Wood v. Davis (1812)), (4) presenting an argument of the (indi-
rectly electorally accountable) U.S. Attorney General to the contrary
(e.g., United States v. Schooner Sally (1805)), or (5) in a case involving a
statute that if read literally would have freed the slave, constructing a
legal argument elaborate enough to produce an anti-freedom result
(Mason v. Matilda (1827)).  (These indicia of legal contestability are
noted in italics in the Table.)  Moreover, the Marshall Court was in-
consistent in its fidelity to the relevant state common law when it came
to applying the slave code of the District of Columbia adopted from
the states of Maryland and Virginia, varying its approach so as both
times to produce a pro-slavery result.  In one instance the Marshall
opinion for the Court, when interpreting the D.C. law on slavery that
governed the formerly Maryland part of the District, substituted its
own judgment as to prudent law rather than follow a particular com-
mon law rule of Maryland on hearsay, which common law rule had
produced a decision freeing the slave.72  (This Court opinion pro-
voked Justice Duvall, of Maryland, to author the only dissenting opin-
ion of his life.)73  Then, in a later decision where following the plain
meaning of Virginia statutory law for the formerly Virginia part of the
70. Roper, supra note 5, at 534.  He does not say where the others fell.  McLean did not R
join the Court until 1830. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).  Justice Duvall,
who joined in 1811, was sufficiently anti-slavery to argue in dissent that “the right to free-
dom is more important than the right of property.”  Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 290, 299 (1813) (Duvall, J., dissenting).  Justice Johnson, who joined the Court in
1804, angered the Southern public by insisting on due process for slaves charged in the
Denmark Vesey uprising.  Roper, supra note 5, at 532–33.  Presumably Roper would rate R
these two as moderately anti-slavery.
71. See, e.g., Jean Edward Smith, Marshall Misconstrued: Activist? Partisan? Reactionary?, 33
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1109, 1123–24 (2000) (citing Marshall’s anti-slavery positions in The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 119–20 (1825); Boyce v. Anderson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 150,
156 (1829); and various pro bono cases that Marshall undertook as the leader of the Rich-
mond bar).
72. Mima Queen, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 298–99.
73. Id.
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District had caused a jury to set free a slave, the Supreme Court an-
nounced itself relieved that it had discovered a Virginia precedent
(i.e., common law) to the contrary to follow, (from 1818, seventeen
years after Congress adopted the Virginia law as part of the D.C.
code),74 which choice resulted in reversing the judge’s instruction to
the jury and thereby the jury’s decision.75  In light of this degree of
available latitude at the edges in these cases, one must conclude that
the Marshall Court in these cases saw itself as engaged in an effort to
firm up property rights in the nascent republic, even when doing so
conflicted with its common law obligation that statutes in doubtful
cases are to be construed “in favorem libertatis.”76  And one must cer-
tainly question Kent Newmyer’s 1969 explanation of this body of deci-
sions: “[T]he Marshall Court did not have substantial lawmaking
discretion in the slavery cases.”77
Other scholars, and Newmyer himself in a detailed reconsidera-
tion thirty years later,78 have produced a variety of explanations for
the degree to which this Court, a majority of whose members opposed
slavery “attitudinally” (as the contemporary jargon of political science
would phrase it)79 produced so many pro-slavery decisions.  Historian
Donald Roper was the first to analyze the topic, and he concluded that
internal division on the Court as to the morality of slavery, com-
pounded by fear of antagonizing Congress into restricting its jurisdic-
tion and by the Court’s own strong commitment to property rights,
caused the Court under Marshall to hide behind the posture that it
was obliged to apply the objectively discovered law in favor of slavery,
even in cases where the law on the subject was contestable and open
to ameliorative interpretation.80  Newmyer, in a biography-length re-
consideration of the subject revised his earlier critique of Roper far
enough to acknowledge that there was some “indeterminacy in the
common law of slavery” that would have permitted Marshall “to ex-
74. See NIEMAN, supra note 18, at 16 (noting that in 1801 Congress adopted the laws of R
Virginia and Maryland for the District of Columbia).
75. See Mason v. Matilda, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 590, 592–94 (1827) (citing a Virginia
Court of Appeals case, Abraham v. Matthews, 20 Va. (6 Munf.) 159 (1818), in reversing a
judgment and finding in favor of a slave master).
76. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (8th ed. 2004).  The rule “in favor of liberty” says to
free someone from bondage where there is doubt as to status.
77. Kent Newmyer, On Assessing the Court in History: Some Comments on the Roper and Burke
Articles, 21 STAN. L. REV. 540, 540–44 (1969).
78. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT
424–34 (2001).
79. J. SEGAL & H. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
80. Roper, supra note 5, at 532–39. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-1\MLR111.txt unknown Seq: 13 11-DEC-07 13:51
178 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:166
tend the area of freedom,” and that he chose not to.81  Still, he insists
(as anyone would grant) that political and legal forces did constrain
the Court in terms of the big picture;82 the Court could not simply
announce, “We believe that slavery is wrong and therefore will no
longer uphold it.”
So my analysis here is discussing amelioration at the edges: pro-
ducing decisions that free particular slaves, that uphold and facilitate
punishment of illegal traders in slaves, that facilitate judicial demon-
stration by one held in slavery that the situation is unlawful, or that
facilitate voluntary manumission.83  In response to the query, “Why
did the Marshall Court not do more in this direction?” the later
Newmyer retreats to the view that the Court did feel bound both by
commitment to property rights and to a federal system that left con-
trol of slaves to each state.84  He also flirts with the possibility that
Marshall’s very public involvement in the colonization movement (as
president of his local chapter from 1823 until his death, and a lifetime
member of, and big donor to, the American Colonization Society, be-
ginning with attendance in December 1816, at its founding meet-
ing)85 is more properly read as an expression of a racist desire to rid
America of blacks than of Marshall’s intellectual opposition to
slavery.86
By contrast, law professor Frances Rudko aligns with Marshall bi-
ographer Jean Edward Smith in reading Marshall as one who genu-
inely “hated” the institution of slavery as a moral and social evil, and
sees him as having believed the best approach to fighting it was by
promoting congressional financial support for colonization as the
only realistic hope for creating incentives for voluntary manumis-
sion.87  Marshall believed that such a program could be effective at
least in large portions of the upper South, and would be fair—Rudko
depicts it as an early nineteenth century version of “forty acres and a
81. NEWMYER, supra note 78, at 426. R
82. Id.
83. This refers to those cases indicated by italicized comments in the Table infra in
which the Marshall Court refused to do these things, even though other legal actors would
have.
84. NEWMYER, supra note 78, at 424–34. R
85. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED AFRICANS IN
THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 105–06 (1977); Rudko,
supra note 69, at 84. R
86. NEWMYER, supra note 78, at 419–23. R
87. Rudko, supra note 69, at 75; see also Smith, supra note 71, at 1124 (asserting that R
Marshall viewed slavery as “unjust and oppressive to blacks, [and] pernicious and debilitat-
ing for whites”).
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mule.”88  Thus she reads Marshall as basically temporizing in those
decisions that strengthened slavery, while he worked diligently off the
bench toward the goal of having Congress deliver the U.S. from this
evil.89
The Table below, a systematic compilation of all the slavery cases
that came before the Marshall Court, was initially compiled in an ef-
fort to sort through these competing interpretations.  The Table
makes apparent two things: (1) As already noted, most of these cases
did present a legally respectable alternative to whichever holding en-
ded up winning over the Court; and (2) The Court observably
changes direction between 1816 and 1817.  Out of a total of thirty-
three cases, eleven go in an anti-liberty direction.  All but one of these
occurred prior to 1817.  It seems impossible to deny that, as a Court,
prior to 1817 the Marshall Court was not only willing to treat slaves as
property, but also in borderline situations showed a much stronger
commitment to the property rights of the slaveholder than the liberty
rights of the enslaved.  Thirteen of the decisions move the law in a
pro-liberty direction (eight produced mixed results; one presented no
obvious direction regarding liberty).  The pro-liberty decisions all oc-
cur in or after 1817.
It is true that none of these cases display the Court directly revers-
ing itself, not even sub silentio, on a single re-litigated point of law.
Nonetheless, a clear shift of policy inclination is observable.  Some-
thing of the flavor of this shift can be seen by consideration of the
following pair of contrasting cases.90  In Davis, a case where litigation
at the Supreme Court continued from 1812 to 1816, the Marshall
Court reversed the first of the circuit court holdings to rule that a
prior judicial ruling that had established a woman as free on the
grounds that she had been proven to be white could not operate to
establish that her children were descended from a white woman and
on that basis legally free.91  By contrast, in M’Cutchen in 1834, in apply-
ing the will of a Tennessean that freed his slaves upon their reaching
age twenty-one, the Supreme Court, although acknowledging that
under Tennessee law offspring born of such a slave before she
reached twenty-one would remain slaves, nonetheless ruled that a law-
suit by heirs making a claim to such slave offspring had to be dis-
88. Smith, supra note 71, at 75, 89.
89. See generally id. at 75–89.
90. Compare Wood v. Davis, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 271 (1812), and Davis v. Wood, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 6 (1816), with M’Cutchen v. Marshall, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 220 (1834) in the Table
infra.
91. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 273.
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missed (and the offspring set free) because the description of the
offspring was too “vague and uncertain.”92
It is not obvious what caused this pro-liberty shift.  One candidate
for explanation is that the cases that begin in 1817 much more typi-
cally involved the slave trade, where congressional sentiment had
been clearly expressed.93  In 1807, Congress first outlawed the import-
ing of slaves, with a law to take effect after December 31.94  It reiter-
ated and refined this law in 1818.95  In 1819 it changed the law’s
disposition of captured slaves; instead of allowing states to sell them
off, they had to be turned over to “the marshal of the district into
which they are brought,” or “to such person or persons as shall be
lawfully appointed by the President of the United States” to be re-
turned to Africa, and Congress appropriated $100,000 for that pur-
pose.96  In 1820, Congress declared it piracy to seize or decoy any
“negro or mulatto” from Africa into slavery or onto a boat intended
for the slave trade and imposed the death penalty therefor.97  More-
over, in the period from 1814–1820, a flurry of diplomatic activity in
the maritime nations of Europe resulted in some restrictions on the
slave trade by France (1817), Portugal (1818) and Spain (1820), pre-
ceded by Britain’s total ban in 1807.98  Thus, one might argue that as
to the slave trade at least, legal proscription was beginning to look like
the civilized thing to do.
Still, this explanation does not cover all the cases.  There are a
number of early cases on the slave trade, with respect to the 1794 law
(and follow-up legislation) banning export or foreign transport of
slaves on U.S. vessels, and the Marshall Court responded leniently to-
ward the accused slave trader despite the facts that Congress had ac-
ted against this trade and the U.S. Attorney General was asking for
conviction.99  Also, there are cases having no direct bearing on the
92. M’Cutchen, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 241.
93. See discussion of case facts under the column headed “Ruling” in the Table infra.
See, e.g., The Emily, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 381 (1824) (involving provisions of the 1794 and
1807 Acts); The Josef Segunda, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 338 (1820) (interpreting and discussing
the 1807 Act prohibiting slave importation).
94. Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426.
95. Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, 3 Stat. 450.
96. Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 101, 3 Stat. 532, 532–34.
97. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, sec. 4, 5, 3 Stat. 600, 600–01.
98. KENT, supra note 67, at 204–05. R
99. Brigantine Amiable Lucy v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 330 (1810); Adams v.
Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805); United States v. Schooner Sally, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
406 (1805).  See also Brig Alerta v. Moran, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 359 (1815); Brig Caroline v.
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 496 (1813), for similar cases of leniency toward the slave
trade prior to 1817.
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slave trade—cases regarding the freeing of individual slaves in the
1817–1835 periods—where the Court produced a pro-freedom deci-
sion, something it never did before 1817.100
Another possibility is that because the so-called Marshall Court
comprised several different natural courts, it was the personnel
change that produced the shift of decisions.  Duvall joined the Court
in 1811 and Story in 1812; no one joined between 1812 and 1823.101
Perhaps the post-1816 Court was a product of the fact that the seven
personalities on the Court needed a few years to gel as a group
around the new personnel mix, which now included the relatively ar-
dently anti-slavery Justice Story.102
Finally, there is the possibility—the one that appears most
likely—that the shift has something to do with colonization policy.
The American Colonization Society was founded in December of
1816.103  Frances Rudko dates Marshall’s involvement in the society as
“almost from its beginning,” since he signed up for a lifetime mem-
bership in 1819 and in 1823 became local chapter president (which
he remained throughout his life).104  But legal scholar (and now fed-
eral judge) John Noonan dates Marshall’s involvement as literally
from the beginning moment of the organization: Marshall attended
that founding meeting in December of 1816.105  Justice Bushrod
Washington was the founding president of the National ACS and re-
mained president for many years.106  Noonan notes that the ACS was
“[f]irmly tied to the judicial branch at its highest level” and that on at
least one occasion several Justices on the Court attended an annual
Colonization Society meeting held at the Supreme Court.107
100. Fenwick v. Chapman, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 461 (1835) (upholding a contestable testa-
mentary manumission); M’Cutchen v. Marshall, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 220 (1834) (same); Le
Grand v. Darnall, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 664 (1829) (same); see also Lee v. Lee, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 44
(1834) (reversing a circuit court decision for failure to give a jury instruction that was
favorable to the slaves petitioning for freedom); Menard v. Aspasia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 505
(1831) (refusing to interfere with a decision of the Missouri Supreme Court setting free a
slave on grounds of bona fide residence in the state); Boyce v. Anderson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
150 (1829) (making it more difficult to recover damages for failure to prevent slaves from
escaping); Beverly v. Brooke, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 100 (1817) (same). But cf. Mason v. Ma-
tilda, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 590 (1827) (rejecting a slave’s suit to be declared free).
101. The Associate Justices who served with Marshall in this period were Bushrod Wash-
ington, William Johnson, Henry B. Livingston, Thomas Todd, Gabriel Duvall, and Joseph
Story.
102. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. R
103. NOONAN, supra note 85, at 105. R
104. Rudko, supra note 69, at 84. R
105. NOONAN, supra note 85, at 105. R
106. Id. at 16, 106–07.
107. Id. at 17, 91.
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It is certainly conceivable that for the judicial votes of these two
morally troubled slaveowners, Marshall and Washington, their being
able to conceive of a way to set the slaves free without imposing mil-
lions of unlettered black people on Southern society was what freed
up their consciences to rule in more pro-liberty ways from 1817 on.108
Whichever of these explanations eventually carries the day, it
seems clear from this systematic look at the Marshall Court’s slavery
decisions that something definitely changed around 1816–1817.  This
something is worth further scholarly exploration. The core details of
the rulings from these cases that raise these questions about the Mar-
shall Court and slavery appear in the table below.
KEY TO TABLE:
1) The direction column uses a plus sign for pro-freedom rulings
and a minus sign for anti-freedom rulings.
2) Italics indicates some element of contestability in Court
ruling.
3) Where opinion author not noted, it is Chief Justice John
Marshall.
4) Where case listed more than once (e.g., Josefa Segundo), later
versions present new issues rather than merely clarifying ear-
lier holding.
108. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. R
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at
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.
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C
ou
rt
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n
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re
te
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m
pe
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w
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de
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lib
el
C
ou
rt
 r
ev
er
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09
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18
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ar
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 s
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ra
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C
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f
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 f
ro
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re
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n
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pl
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en
ce
 t
h
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 d
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h
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bo
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sl
av
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.
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24
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er
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: T
h
es
e 
sl
av
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er
e 
br
ou
gh
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A
la
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m
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fo
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n
de
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.S
. l
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f t
h
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w
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ti
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la
ve
s 
w
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 b
e
de
al
t 
w
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h
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di
n
g 
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, 
“a
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pt
ed
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ea
ft
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f 
th
e 
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at
e 
w
h
er
e 
th
e 
sl
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es
 w
er
e 
br
ou
gh
t 
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. 
T
h
e 
sl
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n
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h
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 c
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e 
w
er
e 
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n
de
re
d 
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 A
la
ba
m
a
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th
or
it
ie
s.
 A
la
ba
m
a 
la
w
 o
f 
18
22
 m
ad
e 
su
ch
 s
la
ve
s 
st
at
e 
la
bo
re
rs
 o
r 
au
ct
io
n
ed
 t
h
em
 t
o 
h
ig
h
es
t 
bi
dd
er
. 
U
.S
. 
la
w
 i
n
 1
81
9 
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de
re
d 
th
at
 s
uc
h
 c
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tu
re
d
sl
av
es
 w
er
e 
fr
ee
 a
n
d 
co
m
pe
lle
d 
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e 
U
.S
. p
re
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de
n
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 a
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an
ge
 t
h
ei
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an
sp
or
ta
ti
on
 b
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k 
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fr
ic
a.
 J
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ef
a 
Se
gu
n
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 I
II
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U
.S
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 P
re
st
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) 
m
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e 
cl
ea
r 
th
at
th
e 
ch
an
ge
 o
f U
.S
. l
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81
9 
(o
rd
er
in
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 b
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n
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 p
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n
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9 
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d 
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ea
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er
.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-1\MLR111.txt unknown Seq: 23 11-DEC-07 13:51
188 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:166
D
A
T
E
C
A
SE
R
U
L
IN
G
A
C
T
IO
N
+/
-
18
25
T
h
e 
Pl
at
ts
bu
rg
h
, 
23
 U
.S
.
C
ou
rt
 r
ul
ed
 t
h
at
 a
 s
la
ve
-tr
ad
in
g 
sc
h
oo
n
er
 s
ei
ze
d 
by
C
ou
rt
 a
ff
ir
m
ed
 d
is
tr
ic
t
+
(1
0 
W
h
ea
t.)
 1
33
 (
18
25
).
U
.S
. 
sh
ip
 o
f 
w
ar
 o
ff
 c
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 d
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 C
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 f
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ad
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 o
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 c
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 c
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25
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ad
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e
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 c
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at
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 c
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 m
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e 
re
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n
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w
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g 
it
).
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sl
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.
C
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 d
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h
e 
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w
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f 
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at
ur
e.
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ir
cu
it 
co
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t 
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h
e 
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se
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ed
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 p
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at
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al
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ew
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by
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 c
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m
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 f
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 f
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 s
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at
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 t
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 c
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 c
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 d
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e
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 c
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n
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 c
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er
e 
la
w
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d 
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 c
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ly
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n
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y 
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de
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ie
s’
 l
aw
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id
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th
e 
Sp
an
is
h
T
h
e 
C
ou
rt
 r
ea
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n
ed
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 s
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se
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w
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go
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m
en
t 
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 d
is
tr
ib
ut
e
en
ga
ge
d 
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ir
ac
y 
on
ly
 i
f 
it
s 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
so
 r
ul
ed
,
to
 t
h
e 
ow
n
er
s.
T
he
 C
ou
rt
’s
an
d 
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h
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e 
sh
ip
s 
m
ay
 b
e 
se
iz
ed
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n
d 
tu
rn
ed
 o
ve
r
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ci
si
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as
 p
ar
tly
 a
ga
in
st
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 t
h
ei
r 
ow
n
 c
ou
n
tr
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s 
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ts
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 t
ri
al
. 
Fu
rt
h
er
-
th
e 
A
tt’
y 
G
en
., 
le
ss
 s
o 
th
an
m
or
e,
 a
 U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
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ea
ty
 r
eq
ui
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d 
th
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 s
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ve
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e 
ci
rc
ui
t 
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ur
t 
de
ci
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ad
pr
op
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 c
ap
tu
re
d 
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m
er
ic
an
 p
ir
at
es
 b
e 
re
tu
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ed
be
en
.
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 r
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 d
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C
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 d
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en
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t
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 b
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 b
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 b
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 a
dd
ed
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
Sp
an
is
h
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h
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 t
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 s
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n
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 o
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ou
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 r
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ed
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h
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h
e
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 p
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n
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n
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h
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 d
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h
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 c
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ch
 c
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h
ad
 i
n
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 c
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tu
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r,
 a
n
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U
n
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h
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n
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f 
th
e 
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 c
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su
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h
ad
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ed
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h
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n
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se
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ed
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n
 h
ig
h
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s 
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 c
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m
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si
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 U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s
ve
ss
el
s 
in
 p
ea
ce
ti
m
e 
w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
be
en
 t
or
ti
ou
sl
y
se
iz
ed
 o
n
ly
 i
f 
th
e 
ve
ss
el
s 
se
iz
ed
 w
er
e 
n
ot
 i
n
vo
lv
ed
 i
n
pi
ra
cy
. 
H
e 
as
se
rt
ed
 t
h
at
 s
la
ve
 t
ra
di
n
g 
m
us
t 
co
un
t 
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pi
ra
cy
 s
in
ce
 i
t 
w
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n
la
w
fu
l 
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de
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w
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h
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un
-
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y 
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 t
h
e 
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at
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d.
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h
e 
bo
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n
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n
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-
in
g 
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 f
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al
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 d
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h
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ad
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 b
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n
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 t
h
e 
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w
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f
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ra
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ad
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 r
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 t
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 f
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 p
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n
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sh
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n
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 c
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 r
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ra
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er
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 d
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h
ad
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is
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o
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ey
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h
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ed
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n
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w
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 c
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 d
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g 
ve
ss
el
” 
h
ad
 t
o 
be
 a
n
 o
ff
ic
er
II
I.
)
of
 U
.S
. 
“a
rm
ed
 v
es
se
l, 
or
 r
ev
en
ue
 c
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n
g 
th
e 
ca
se
 i
n
fe
de
ra
l 
co
ur
t.
  
(T
h
is
 d
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ra
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h
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 p
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 p
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 r
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n
ia
) 
st
at
ut
e
R
ev
er
se
d 
D
.C
. 
co
un
ty
 c
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 b
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 d
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a 
et
 a
l.,
 w
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 r
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 d
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 b
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 c
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h
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at
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CONCLUSION
One preliminary conclusion here about the Marshall Court is
that, despite whatever doubts a majority of the Justices harbored
about a clash between moral or natural law and slavery, they systemati-
cally voted prior to 1817 to uphold slavery or go easy on slave traders,
even in many cases where a legally respectable conclusion could have
gone the other way.  Beginning in 1817, the situation changed.  The
Justices appeared to begin to pay much more attention to the com-
mon law principle of “in favorem libertatis.” Why this is so is not defini-
tively discoverable, although this Essay has suggested tentatively that
the most likely candidate for triggering the change was the coming
into being of the American Colonization Society.  In any event, that a
marked shift took place is hard to dispute.
For a second conclusion, one can now reconsider the inquiry that
began this Essay.  Did Hamilton’s prediction about the tendency of
judicial independence to “mitigate[ ] the severity” of “unjust and par-
tial laws” prove valid for the federal judiciary up until 1835?111  One
would have to answer that it varied across time.  In the time period
from 1776 through 1791, legislatures and constitutional conventions
were exceptionally pro-liberty, freeing slaves,112 outlawing slavery in
the Northwest Territory,113 and writing a twenty-year limit on the im-
port of slaves into the Constitution.114  But Congress quickly re-
trenched, adopting a Fugitive Slave Law by 1793 that appeared to be
more anti-liberty than the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution
actually warranted,115 and imposing both slavery (in 1801) and racial
hierarchy (in 1812) on the District of Columbia.116  Until 1817 the
U.S. Supreme Court undeniably supported the slavery system in its
decisions, supported it more than law itself demanded, if one can as-
sume that the lower federal courts and the U.S. Attorney General
knew law as well as the Justices did.117  Between 1817 and 1820 Con-
gress adopted a number of increasingly strict laws opposing the slave
trade,118 and the Court too became harsh on slave traders and also
relatively lenient toward slaves.119  At this point a divergence begins:
Southern state legislatures cracked down on free black sailors, refus-
111. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. R
112. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. R
113. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. R
114. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. R
115. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text. R
116. See supra notes 19–20, 38, and 60 and accompanying text. R
117. See Table supra.
118. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. R
119. See Table supra.
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ing to let them circulate freely, and insisted on banning free discus-
sion of slavery.120  With the latter, the Jackson Administration basically
cooperated.121  In this period the federal judiciary did offer some re-
sistance and also continued its post-1816 toughness toward partici-
pants in the slave trade and leniency toward slaves who could make a
plausible legal case for their freedom.122  So from 1820–1835 one can
conclude that the Marshall Court was somewhat more anti-slavery and
more the defender of free blacks than was either Congress or the Pres-
ident.  The difference at this point is not stark, but perhaps in light of
the youth of the institution, it is all that even Hamilton might have
expected from the “least dangerous branch.”
120. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. R
121. See supra text accompanying note 48. R
122. See Table supra.
